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ANALYSIS OF BIDDING BEHAVIORS IN NON-MONETARY 





The Navy continually fights economic surge and recession, budget constraints, and 
natural personnel turnover to maintain personnel levels at desired “end-strength.” 
Forecasting retention bonus levels based on these socio-economic factors is extremely 
difficult. Current forecasting techniques are less precise than retention auctions because 
auctions provide the market clearing price to retain the desired end strength. This 
research examines bidding strategies adopted within a retention auction incorporating 
monetary and non-monetary retention incentives in a competitive bidding environment. 
This research compared user inputs across several subjects and determined which 
subjects to retain. Previous experiments compared participants’ bids to computer 
simulated “optimal” bids; it was hard to say how or if bidding strategies would change if 
competing with other live players. 
There are two issues when dealing with optimal bidding strategies. The first is 
correct choosing non-monetary incentives. We found that 70% of these choices were 
made correctly.  The second involves the salary requested after choosing non-monetary 
incentives. The salary requests were above the optimal bids. Coupled with the fact that 
non-monetary incentives were generally chosen correctly, this shows that most 
participants miscalculated their salary request. Other controls and instructions should be 
introduced prior to implementing a formal retention auction 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) has been effectively used to shape force 
structure and personnel levels. The SRB program allows the Navy to forecast prospective 
losses against required numbers. This enables the service to provide bonuses in certain 
ratings that incentivizes reenlisting and aids in maintaining desired personnel levels. 
However, the current program exhibits limitations that increase the cost to the Navy by 
providing force levels that are not commensurate with current manpower requirements. 
This research investigates the practicality of auction mechanisms as retention 
tools. Past research dictates that personnel bid rationally against computer generated bids 
whose feedback demonstrates ideal bidding. In purely competitive bidding, subjects will 
receive feedback that may not reflect ideal strategies resulting in retention costs that may 
fall well above or below the market clearing cost. An experiment designed to test this 
behavior was conducted and analyzed to determine implementation potential and identify 
further controls to shape outcomes. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Navy, along with the other armed services, continually fights the affects of 
economic surge and recession, budget constraints, and natural personnel turnover in an 
effort to maintain manpower levels at desired “end-strength.” Subsequently, mandated 
quantities of specialized ratings require particular attention from manpower specialists to 
maintain a lean diverse force. These specialized, highly technical, ratings demonstrate 
large fluctuations depending on the civilian economic environment and current promotion 
limitations.  
Forecasting retention bonus levels based on the above socio-economic factors is 
extremely difficult. The resultant manpower surpluses and deficits cause excessive 
burdens to manpower costs, military efficiency, and equipment. Current forecasting 
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techniques are less precise than retention auction mechanisms because, in theory, auction 
mechanisms provide the exact desired manpower at the lowest price to the employer.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research addresses the following questions: 
1. Primary Question 
What bidding strategies are adopted within a uniform-price real-time auction 
mechanism employing non-monetary incentives and human subject competition? 
2. Secondary Questions 
a. Does competition between human subjects alter bidding strategies as opposed 
to bidding against predetermined computerized values? 
b. Is the real-time auction viable based on alterations or consistencies in subjects’ 
bidding strategies? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This project includes comparative analysis of real-time competitive uniform 
auctions and past iterations of the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism 
(CRAM). It also briefly discusses the current SRB program and its limitations. Past 
research in the field and experimental results will provide the required data to answer the 
research questions. This project will investigate Non-monetary Incentives (NMI) in a 
non-specific manner that will maintain continuity of experimentation for all participants. 
The study focuses primarily on implementing an improved SRB program using auction 
mechanisms incorporating NMIs. 
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter I describes the purpose of this project as well as the questions it intends 
to address. Chapter II is a background on military retention and compensation. Chapter 
III is a literature review that addresses past research into the field of retention auctions. It 
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also focuses on the current problems with the SRB system and retention in critical 
ratings. Chapter IV describes the CRAM concept and its application to this experiment 
and project. Chapter V focuses on the materials and methods used in this experiment and 
project. Chapter VI includes a discussion of the experimental design. Chapter VII 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 5
II. MILITARY RETENTION AND COMPENSATION 
A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Manpower retention initiatives within the United States Navy help maintain 
desired force levels in critical ratings facing frequent turnover attributed to favorable 
outside job offers. The natural ebb and flow of the civilian economic environment affects 
the monetary investment required to maintain personnel levels. A market-clearing price 
must be defined for each reenlistment group throughout the year. Sailors in technical 
ratings generally receive higher reenlistment bonuses because the private sector values 
their skills and the Navy has incurred a higher training cost. Conversely, during times of 
economic downturn, the Navy often observes men and women with high technical 
acumen joining the military, as job offers may be low to non-existent in the civilian 
sector. 
B. PERSONNEL COSTS 
Personnel costs are the second largest portion of the defense budget at 
$138.5 Billion for Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, accounting for more than 25% of the total 
budget.1 Military Personnel trails only Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and even 
exceeds Military Procurement by a full 5% as a ratio of appropriation category to overall 
budget request.2 Personnel funding rose 2.6% from FY 2010 to 2011, while O&M and 
procurement rose between 7.7 and 8.5 %.3 The current lull in military personnel funding 
can be attributed to the steady decline of force strength as a result of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) guidance to attain the most efficient end-strength while maintaining a capable 
 
 
                                                 
1 Department of Defense, “Summary of the DOD Fiscal 2011 Budget Proposal,” Defense GOV, 
http://www.defense.gov/news/final%20press%20release%20v3%20%201.pdf. 




military. The JCS guidance tasks the military to, “articulate a vision for the future force, 
including an estimate of future threats and the military requirements to counter those 
threats.”4 
Bonuses account for approximately 2.5–3% of the Department of Defense 
personnel budget for 2011, or approximately $4 billion.5 The growth of O&M and 
procurement is a product of the two-front war in which the U.S. is currently involved; 
one assumes that once the U.S. withdraws from the region, the current upswing will turn 
into declining cost deltas in both O&M and procurement. Conversely, the current military 
“end-strength” is on par with desired peacetime service levels. The JCS’ goal is to 
provide full spectrum forces that do not require downsizing or buildup following or prior 
to a conflict. 
C. TRENDS IN MANPOWER LEVELS 
The historically massive departure of service members following major conflicts, 
both voluntarily and involuntarily, creates knowledge and leadership vacuums that persist 
well into future conflicts. The draft’s demise and advent of the all volunteer force affords 
some stability within the ranks due to the voluntary nature of enlistments; however, 
competition with civilian jobs makes it necessary to institute a bonus program to further 
alleviate fluctuations in manning. The current state of the nation’s economy requires new 
methods of forecasting bonus levels, as existing service members are likely to stay in the 
military under the increasingly uncertain civilian job market. Many services have chosen 
to defer reenlistment bonuses for many specialties, due in large part to the unfavorable 
economic outlook. However, we cannot assume a stagnant economy in perpetuity and, 
absent new bonuses, personnel shortfalls will resume. 
                                                 
4 Mike Mullen, “CJCS Guidance 2008-2009,” Small Wars Journal, 4, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/cjcsguidance.pdf.. 
5 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, “Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 
2011,” Defense Comptroller, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/fy2011_m1o1rf1.pdf. 
 7
 
Figure 1.   Navy Manpower Trends 2003–2010 (projected)6 
Personnel costs and defense budgeting concerns led to a congressionally 
authorized “end strength” for all services. The Navy’s authorized end strength is 
329,0007 sailors, forcing the naval service to reduce manning on ships and equipment to 
minimal levels. These levels cannot feasibly be reduced any further without first reducing 
the number of navy ships and commands. The Department of the Navy cut approximately 
8,000-10,000 personnel per year between 2002 and 2009 to reach the mandated end 
strength.8 While fluctuations to end strength have occurred amongst the Army and 
Marine Corps as a result of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Navy numbers have 
stayed constant, in large part due to consistency of operations. Consequently, Navy 
retention costs vary with the civilian economic climate, but rarely fluctuate due to 
wartime end-strength increases.  
                                                 
6 Navy Personnel Command, 2009. 
7 Gerry Gilmore, “Navy Stabilizes Force as it Nears End-Strength Goal, Admiral Says,” Navy Times, 
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=43597. 
8 Gerry Gilmore, “Navy Stabilizes Force as it Nears End-Strength Goal, Admiral Says,” Navy Times, 
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=43597. 
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D. NAVY SRB PROGRAM 
Navy instruction 1160.8A states, “SRB is the Navy's primary monetary Force 
shaping tool to achieve enlisted retention requirements in ratings, Navy Enlisted 
Classifications (NECs) and skills.”9  
The program has proven influential in efficiently retaining sailors in many of the 
Navy’s most technically difficult ratings. The system itself is relatively agile, with 
bonuses reevaluated annually and monetary awards removed for reenlistments once 
rating quotas have been filled for the year. The Naval Personnel Command evaluates 
many complex factors to meet retention goals within varying economic climates.  
Navy directives to the Personnel Command: 
 Reviews are conducted at least annually to determine which 
ratings/NECs/skills will be authorized SRBs. 
 Award levels are changed in response to market forces as retention 
changes in ratings, NECs and skills. 
 Changes to the list of SRB eligible ratings/NECs/skills and respective 
award levels will normally be promulgated by naval message10 
The program’s importance cannot be overstated. Even in the post recession 
economy of FY 2011, the Navy plans to commit to bonuses for 17,000 sailors within 135 
critical ratings, with individual awards up to $90,000.11 Present economic indicators 
logically dictate removing most SRB awards; however, the need for specialized skills in 
both the civilian and military contracting sector constantly cause large retention voids 
regardless of market forces. 
Criteria for determining SRB: 
 Severe under manning in three or more adjacent year groups in the bonus 
zone. 
                                                 
9 U.S. Navy, OPNAV Instruction 1160-8A: Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters United States Navy, 2007), 2. 
10 U.S. Navy, OPNAV Instruction 1160-8A: Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters United States Navy, 2007), 2. 
11 Chief of Naval Personnel, “Navy Announces Updates to Selective Reenlistment Bonus,” Navy 
Times, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=55844. 
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 Severe under manning as shown by a history of shortages in past years or 
projected for future years. 
 High training and replacement costs. 
 Relatively arduous or unattractive skill compared to the other 
ratings/NECs/skills or civilian alternatives. 
 Skill is essential to the mission of the Navy. 
 A reasonable prospect of enough improvement in retention in response to 
the award to justify the cost.12 
1. Reenlistment Criteria and Bonus Zones 
The SRB program does not allow for all military personnel to reenlist for a bonus. 
Those sailors who have more than 14 years of service are ineligible for bonuses under the 
SRB program.  
Specifically,  
SRB eligibility is limited to members with 17 months of continuous active 
duty (other than for training) but not more than to 14 years of active duty. 
This time period has been further divided into three zones as described in 
Table 1.13 
 
Table 1.   Navy SRB Zones14  
                                                 
12 U.S. Navy, OPNAV Instruction 1160-8A: Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters United States Navy, 2007), 2. 
13 U.S. Navy, OPNAV Instruction 1160-8A: Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters United States Navy, 2007), 5. 
14 U.S. Navy, OPNAV Instruction 1160-8A: Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters United States Navy, 2007). 
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Each service member is allowed one reenlistment bonus per zone. As a result, the 
maximum number of reenlistment bonuses per service member during a career is three. 
This is in great contrast to a civilian business system that generally renegotiates contracts 
on a yearly or bi-yearly basis. However, once outside the bonus zones, sailors may 
reenlist for non-monetary incentives discussed with their detailers. These alternatives to 
monetary incentives are discussed in chapter 3. 
2. Perform to Serve Program 
The Perform to Serve (PTS) program runs in concert with the SRB program, 
vetting sailors prior to allowing them to reenlist. This program gives reenlistment 
precedence to sailors based on regularly scheduled evaluations and awards.  
The purpose of PTS is to provide,  
…a long-term force shaping tool that aids in leveling rating manning 
between overmanned and undermanned ratings, while managing the 
quality of reenlistment applicants by controlling the authority for 
reenlistment.15 
Historically, the SRB system allowed most sailors to reenlist simply by date requested 
and on the merits of decent conduct and average performance. Problems arose when 
outstanding sailors requested reenlistment after the rating quota had been met for the 
year. This caused the outstanding sailors to lose out on bonuses simply because of bad 
reenlistment timing. Many of those sailors felt snubbed by the system and chose to leave 
the Navy, creating a knowledge vacuum and loss of major investments in personnel 
training and experience. The PTS program serves to rank sailors in order of preference 
for reenlistment to mitigate the SRB system shortcomings.   
                                                 
15 U.S. Navy, Military Personnel Manual 1440-060: Perform to Serve (Washington, DC: Headquarters 
United States Navy, 2006), 1. 
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3. Weaknesses 
The SRB program’s inherent weaknesses stem from the inability to forecast 
retention intentions with complete accuracy. As bonuses become available, sailors who 
may have been counted as prospective losses choose to stay due to various factors. 
Factors that affect prospective retention decisions: 
 Status of outside job offers 
 Size of bonus incentive 
 Job security 
 Options for continued training and education 
 Health Care 
 Housing costs and allowances 
 Arising personal issues 
There is no feasible method to calculate or estimate changes in preferences 
throughout the FY without continually monitoring each member that qualifies for 
reenlistment. This system characteristic makes it impossible to obtain a market-clearing 
price for bonuses that does not lead to over manning or personnel shortfalls. Imprecise 
manpower retention predictions lead to over- or undermanned ratings, inaccurate 
bonuses, and the potential loss of highly qualified sailors. It typically leads to bonuses 
that are higher than required for proper retention given a certain period within the fiscal 
year. 
The trend of over manning that is historically prevalent within the services 
demonstrates that the services typically overestimate the required bonus. Consequently, 
the use of past data and future assumptions continue to exacerbate the issue of errant 
forecasting. Excesses and shortfalls in manning increase military costs and can 
compromise readiness. When excesses arise, the military must pay the excess sailors’ 
basic pay, special pays, and benefits such as health and dental care. When shortfalls 
occur, the Navy is forced to fill the knowledge and leadership void by training new 
sailors up to the level of those that separated or risk equipment deterioration, loss of 
manpower required for national tasking, and delays in deployments.  
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Many trends in the civilian economy influence attraction and detraction from 
reenlistment. Current Navy SRB standards dictate that not all sailors will even meet the 
requirements to receive a bonus and even fewer will receive one due to overmanned 
ratings. The general lack of continuity within the Navy retention system in complex 
economic environments makes it nearly impossible to predict the cost required to 
efficiently maintain end strength numbers. These shortfalls not only incur a high 
monetary cost to the Navy’s personnel budget—they quite frequently create vacuums in 
expertise and leadership that cost far more in the long run than properly negotiated 
bonuses at the end of a sailor’s term with the service. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Monetary incentives are currently the only defined means of encouraging 
retention amongst military personnel. However, options such as geographic security, 
advanced schooling, etc., also entice sailors to maintain their service. These incentives 
vary between sailors and are usually offered when the sailor falls outside of the 
designated zones required for a reenlistment bonus. Coupling non-monetary incentives 
(NMIs) and monetary incentives into a bonus package can reduce the cost of retaining a 
sailor by utilizing military infrastructure to provide a higher value than what could be 
obtained through simple monetary bonuses. 
B. MONETARY REENLISTMENT BONUSES 
An all-volunteer force leads to a very pronounced need for reenlistment incentives 
to maintain a capable, experienced military. To this end, “the most straightforward 
approach to retention bonuses is to only use monetary incentives.”16 The Navy currently 
offers bonuses ranging from a couple thousand dollars to over $70,000 for rates of high 
technical acumen and those of critical need. Even so, a former Naval Postgraduate School 
study indicates the desire of sailors to leave the Navy regardless of the value of an SRB 
package.17 One of the methods to deal with the diminishing attractiveness of monetary 
reenlistment packages amongst sailors is to deliver incentives tailored to individual 
sailors. Monetary incentives simply do not address the unique requirements of sailors 
and, as a result, many sailors look elsewhere for employment when their enlistments 
lapse. 
                                                 
16 Peter J. Coughlan, William R. Gates and Brooke M. Zimmerman, “The Combinatorial Retention 
Auction Mechanism (CRAM): Integrating Monetary and Non-Monetary Re-Enlistment 
Incentives.”(Technical report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). 
17 Constance M. Denmond, Derek N. Johnson, Chavius G. Lewis and Christopher R. Zegley, 
“Combinatorial Auction Theory Applied to the Selection of Surface Warfare Officer Retention Incentives” 
(MBA professional report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
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C. NON-MONETARY REENLISTMENT INCENTIVES 
Non-monetary incentives are those that are non-cash, but have a non-trivial 
market value.18 These incentives do not include intrinsically valued merits, such as 
service to country as, by definition, the intrinsic value of that service is not defined by 
perceived equivalent monetary value. While it has been shown that employees generally 
prefer monetary to non-monetary incentives,19 studies infrequently explore synergies 
between the two in combination. 
D. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
Webster’s dictionary describes experimental economics as, “the application of the 
laboratory method to test the validity of various economic theories and to test bed new 
market mechanisms.”20 The application of these theories involves human subjects 
competing in controlled environments. However, the issue of false equilibria emerging 
within economic experiments makes it difficult to determine exactly how efficiently 
subjects will react to the experimental environment. False equilibria are any perceived 
strategies that subjects use to justify a departure from cooperation during game theory 
experiments. We naturally assume that rational behavior (greatest personal good) will be 
the main driver of strategy in economic experiments. If the experiment is cooperative, for 
example, the subjects should cooperate to achieve the greatest good possible. 
E. TYPES OF ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS 
Three distinct types of experiments pervade experimental economics. Each of the 
three, individual decision theory experiments, game theory experiments, and price theory 
experiments provide distinctive advantages over their counterparts, depending on the 
experiment and results required.* 
                                                 
18 Scott Jeffrey, “The Benefits of Tangible Non-Monetary Incentives” (Graduate School of Business, 
University of Chicago, 2003), 1. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Definition taken from http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/. 
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*NOTE: Price theory and individual decision theory have been covered 
extensively in other theses dealing with the CRAM concept and those involved with other 
branches of military retention (Hahn, 2010; Browning and Burr, 2009; Zimmerman, 
2008). 
1.  Game Theory Experiments 
Game theory is a class of mathematical models that describes rational agent 
interaction.21 These models focus on the subjects’ rational decision-making while not 
allowing collusion. However, the success or failure is predicated on honest valuation of 
their current state. The typical example for academia is the “Prisoner’s Dilemma.”  
In the prisoner’s dilemma, authorities have arrested two subjects. The police 
suspect one of them in the commission of a major crime, but have arrested both on a 
lesser charge allowing them time for questioning.  
 
Figure 2.   Prisoner’s Dilemma22 
                                                 
21 Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt, Experimental Economics (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1993). 
22 Amanda G. Browning and Clinton F. Burr, “Monetary and Non-Monetary SWO Retention Bonuses: 
An Experimental Approach to the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM),” (MBA 
professional report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009). 
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The prisoner’s dilemma is illustrated in Figure 8 above. The police have offered 
plea bargains to both in exchange for information about and any implications as to the 
perpetrator of the crime. If neither subject confesses, they both receive two years in 
prison. If both confess, they receive six-year sentences. However, if one confesses and 
the other does not, the one that confessed will receive no jail time while the other is 
incarcerated for ten years.  
The whole premise behind the prisoner’s dilemma is that without knowledge of 
another’s strategy, one must decide whether to confess or stay quiet. Because the jail time 
is less if both remain silent, that would be the preferred outcome. The dilemma is that 
without cooperating, both prisoners do better by confessing whether the other prisoner 
confesses or stays quiet. Thus, without cooperating both prisoners want to confess while 
both should stay quiet if they could cooperate.  The inherent decision-making processes 
of risk neutral individuals—members that show propensity to confess—make it much 
more difficult to make sound choices with such complex results.    
F. INFLUENCES AND IRRATIONALITY 
It has been shown that subjects process various other forms of influences from 
their environment during economic experiments. These influences are known as “type 
uncertainty.”23 Players attempt to figure out the strategies of other subjects and exploit 
them for their benefit. “The idea is that if players are uncertain about other players’ types, 
then the possibility emerges that players will mimic a type different from their own.”24 
However, the issue of false equilibria emerging within economic experiments makes it 
difficult to determine exactly how efficiently subjects will react to the experimental 
environment. We naturally assume that rational behavior (greatest personal good) will be 
the main driver of strategy in economic experiments. If the experiment is cooperative, for 
example, the subjects should cooperate in order to achieve the greatest personal good 
possible. 
                                                 
23 Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin A. McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith, “Behavioral Foundations of 
Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology,” Economic Inquiry 36 (1998): 336. 
24 Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin A. McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith, “Behavioral Foundations of 
Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology,” Economic Inquiry 36 (1998): 336. 
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G. REAL-TIME EXPERIMENTATION 
Previous experiments conducted for CRAM relied on human subjects in 
competition with preset database values.25 These experiments yielded extremely valuable 
data on the ability of participants to choose rationally. In reality, we assume the 
competition happens among a group of people, devoid of collusive affects, and without 
prior knowledge of rational bidding strategies relative to game theory experimentation. 
Because these earlier experiments gave feedback based on predetermined values, most 
subjects recognized the optimal bidding strategy rather quickly and found continued 
success throughout the process.  
Based on type uncertainties26 and, absent any knowledge of appropriate bidding 
strategies, human subjects in real-time competition may exhibit irrational behaviors not 
established in previous tests. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Extensive testing of retention methods needs to be conducted prior to fielding due 
to the variations in risk-taking among sailors. The uncertainty with respect to levels of 
cooperation and truth revealing could lead to inefficiencies in the retention system. The 
results of this project aim to identify any weaknesses in the CRAM concept and 
recognize further controls that may be required if utilized by the U.S. Navy. 
                                                 
25 Kyle Hahn, “Investigating the Independent and Combinatorial Effects of Non-Monetary Incentives 
Utilizing a Uniform and Discriminatory Auction Mechanism in an Experimental Setting,” (MBA Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
26 Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin A. McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith, “Behavioral Foundations of 
Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology,” Economic Inquiry 36 (1998): 336. 
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IV. CRAM 
A. RETENTION AUCTIONS 
Simple monetary retention auctions address the overarching problem of retaining 
the precise number of personnel desired for any given retention cycle. What this auction 
fails to address is the ability to provide exact retention while offering the potential for 
lower total cost. Non-monetary incentives offer a method to provide higher compensation 
value to reenlistees at an equivalent or lower cost than that of a simple monetary auction. 
This project narrows the scope of experimentation to a uniform auction with menu style 
NMI elicitation because this method affords the opportunity to lower cost over traditional 
auctions.27 
There are many characteristics that define retention auctions. Some of these 
include the number of bidders, number of sellers, well-defined supply and demand 
systems, as well as complex bidding rules and auction results. The auctions dealt with 
within this project, known as labor retention auctions, allow the employer (buyer) to 
engage in a reverse auction with its employees (sellers) that streamlines the retention 
process while providing optimal cost for those retained. Figure 3 demonstrates the unique 
characteristics of this auction. 
 
                                                 
27 Constance M. Denmond, Derek N. Johnson, Chavius G. Lewis and Christopher R. Zegley, 
“Combinatorial Auction Theory Applied to the Selection of Surface Warfare Officer Retention Incentives” 
(MBA professional report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
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Figure 3.   CRAM Characteristics28 
B. COMBINATORIAL RETENTION AUCTION MECHANISM (CRAM) 
CRAM combines monetary and non-monetary incentives in a reverse, truth-
revealing auction enabling the Navy to retain the exact number of personnel desired at the 
optimal cost. This mechanism utilizes a reverse auction in which subjects enter bids 
based on perceived willingness to serve coupled with the personal worth of any NMIs 
offered. Preliminary economics experiments have been conducted with CRAM to better 
understand human bidding behavior in this context. In these preliminary experiments, 
participants compete against computerized decisions that reflect optimal bidding 
strategies. To generate a baseline monetary worth, the computer assigns each 
experimental participant an alternate job offer from a rival employer (Company B). This 
serves to establish a basic personal worth that is then coupled with the personal value for 
each NMI offered by the subjects’ current employer (Company A), also established by 
the computer program.  
                                                 
28 Peter J. Coughlan, William R. Gates and Brooke M. Zimmerman, “The Combinatorial Retention 
Auction Mechanism (CRAM): Integrating Monetary and Non-Monetary Re-Enlistment 
Incentives.”(Technical report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). 
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Figure 4.   CRAM Example29 
C. PRICING METHODS IN PURELY MONETARY RETENTION 
AUCTIONS 
Within the CRAM concept, there are two distinct Pricing methods that determine 
the monetary compensation each retained sailor will receive; each method influences 
rational bidding strategy in a very different way.  
1. Uniform Pricing Method 
The uniform pricing method provides each retained sailor with an equivalent 
monetary salary/bonus. The monetary bonus awarded to each retained sailor is equal to 
the highest salary bid of those retained (set in practice by the salary requested in the first 
excluded bid). For example, if the highest salary bid of those retained is $50,000 then all 
sailors retained would receive a monetary value of $50,000. This method initially appears 
to yield a high cost to the military because you are ”overpaying” sailors willing to reenlist 
                                                 
29 Peter J. Coughlan, William R. Gates and Brooke M. Zimmerman, “The Combinatorial Retention 
Auction Mechanism (CRAM): Integrating Monetary and Non-Monetary Re-Enlistment 
Incentives.”(Technical report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). 
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for smaller bonuses. In uniform price auctions with NMIs, the total cost of the 
compensation provided each retained sailor equals the total cost of the compensation 
requested by the first excluded bidder, including both the monetary compensation 
awarded and the cost for any NMIs provided.30 
 
Figure 5.   First Price (Uniform Auction)31 
2. Discriminatory Pricing Method 
In the discriminatory pricing method, each retained sailor receives only the 
monetary bonus requested in his or her retention bid. In this case, if the highest salary bid 
of those retained is $50,000 and the lowest is $15,000, the retained sailor with the highest 
bid would receive $50,000 and the sailor with the lowest bid $15,000. In a discriminatory 
price auction, the optimal bidding strategy is to overstate your minimum required bonus, 
 
 
                                                 
30 Kyle Hahn, “Investigating the Independent and Combinatorial Effects of Non-Monetary Incentives 
Utilizing a Uniform and Discriminatory Auction Mechanism in an Experimental Setting,” (MBA Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 26. 
31 Kyle Hahn, “Investigating the Independent and Combinatorial Effects of Non-Monetary Incentives 
Utilizing a Uniform and Discriminatory Auction Mechanism in an Experimental Setting,” (MBA Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
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where the size of the overstatement depends on your estimate for the highest acceptable 
bid and your attitudes toward avoiding risk; the greater your aversion to risk the less you 
overstate your bid.32 
Discriminatory pricing within the military causes issues amongst reenlistees by 
creating large margins in incentive packages attributed to differences in outside 
employment options, preferences for military service and risk aversion when bidding. 
Ironically, sailors most willing to serve are rewarded with lower retention bonuses. 
Discriminatory price auctions also do not have the benefit of being truth revealing, which 
would allow trend analysis for future retention projections and opportunity costs.33  
While the discriminatory price auction would appear to reduce the military’s retention 
costs by not “overpaying” those more willing to serve, auction theory and actual 
experience indicates that both discriminatory and uniform price auctions involve 
approximately the same cost, as long as bidders are not significantly averse to risk. As 
such, a discriminatory auction offers the same overall cost as a uniform auction; better 
termed as the revenue equivalence theory.34 
                                                 
32 Kyle Hahn, “Investigating the Independent and Combinatorial Effects of Non-Monetary Incentives 
Utilizing a Uniform and Discriminatory Auction Mechanism in an Experimental Setting,” (MBA Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 28. 
33Hahn, 31. 
34 Kyle Hahn, “Investigating the Independent and Combinatorial Effects of Non-Monetary Incentives 
Utilizing a Uniform and Discriminatory Auction Mechanism in an Experimental Setting,” (MBA Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 31. 
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Figure 6.   Second Price (Discriminatory Auction)35 
D. NMI ELICITATION METHODS 
There are two distinct manners used to elicit NMI bids in CRAM, yielding four 
possible CRAM experimental methods (2 Pricing Methods X 2 NMI Elicitation 
Methods). 
 
                                                 
35 Kyle Hahn, “Investigating the Independent and Combinatorial Effects of Non-Monetary Incentives 
Utilizing a Uniform and Discriminatory Auction Mechanism in an Experimental Setting,” (MBA Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
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Figure 7.   Pricing and NMI Elicitation Matrix36 
1. Menu Approach 
The menu approach reveals Company A’s cost of each NMI to the bidder. It is 
then up to the subject to either take or reject the incentive based on their personal NMI 
valuation. If the bidder accepts an NMI and is retained, the NMI cost is included in the 
cost to retain that subject when determining the lowest cost employees to retain. For 
example, we assume that the NMI cost to the corporation is represented by the variable 
“Nc” and the subject’s personal valuation of the NMI is represented by the variable “Nv.” 
If the bidder is rational, they will reject the NMI if (Nc > Nv). Again, assuming rational 
bidding, the bidder will accept the NMI if (Nc <= Nv). In the menu approach, any NMI 
selected by the bidder will automatically be awarded to any retained employee as the cost 
was revealed during bidding. 
2. Bid Approach  
The bid approach does not reveal the company’s cost to provide the NMI. It 
simply asks for a numerical valuation based on a specific NMI or NMI combination. In 
                                                 
36 Peter J. Coughlan, William R. Gates and Brooke M. Zimmerman, “The Combinatorial Retention 
Auction Mechanism (CRAM): Integrating Monetary and Non-Monetary Re-Enlistment 
Incentives.”(Technical report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). 
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this approach, the bidder may be given the NMI “1 year of childcare.” Based on personal 
history, the bidder generates a value they would require to provide themselves with 1 
year of childcare. In this case, we assume the same variables as the menu approach (Nc, 
Nv). However, in the bid approach the subject enters a value for Nv. If (Nv < Nc) the 
NMI is not awarded because it costs the employer more to provide the service than the 
employee’s value of said service. The NMI is only awarded where (Nv >= Nc), as the 
subject’s value is at least equal to the cost required to provide the service. In the bid 
method, the subject’s monetary bonus is reduced by the employer’s cost to provide that 
NMI. 
The experiments designed for this report are uniform price, menu method 
auctions. 
E. NON-MONETARY VALUE AND COST SAVINGS 
Non-Monetary incentives can potentially save the military money if they provide 
a service that the sailor values more than the cost of supplying that service. For instance, 
the Navy may provide childcare at no cost as a non-monetary incentive to a sailor for a 
term equal to that of their reenlistment. We will assume the Navy’s cost to provide the 
service is $5,000 and the sailor values the childcare at $7,000. If the sailor were offered a 
simple monetary incentive, his request might be the $7,000 required to satisfy his 
childcare requirement. Because the Navy is able to cover that requirement for $2,000 less 
($7,000 - $5,000) the sailor is satisfied that he has received an equivalent service value of 
$7,000 while the Navy has incurred only $5,000 in cost.  
Figure 6 illustrates a simple savings example. 
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Figure 8.   Example: CRAM Savings37 
F. PROCESS 
This project uses a menu style NMI solicitation method and uniform auction to 
determine bidder retention. The values used in this CRAM model are:  
 ISO the salary offer from Firm B 
 NMI1v is the personal value of NMI #1 
 NMI1c is the Firm A cost to provide NMI #1 
 NMI2v is the personal value of NMI #2 
 NMI2c is the Firm A cost to provide NMI #1 
 NMICv is the personal value of receiving both NMIs in combination  
 S is the bidder’s salary request 
 Bi is the bidder’s total cost to Firm A as calculated by the formulas: 
 COV is the Bi of the first rejected bidder. 
 N is the number of bidders 
 RANK is the rank of each player 
 Rr is the retention rate 
 
                                                 
37 Peter J. Coughlan, William R. Gates and Brooke M. Zimmerman, “The Combinatorial Retention 
Auction Mechanism (CRAM): Integrating Monetary and Non-Monetary Re-Enlistment 
Incentives.”(Technical report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). 
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 Nr is the number of bidders to retain 
 FI is the final income paid to each bidder 
1. Calculations 
Once bidders select any desired NMIs and enter their salary request, S, the 
following calculations are performed to find the total cost, Bi, of each bidder to Firm A: 
 Bi = S + (NMI1c); When only NMI #1 is selected; 
 Bi = S + (NMI2c); When only NMI #2 is selected; and, 
 Bi = S + (NMI1c + NMI2c); When both NMIs are selected 
2. Bidder Ranking and Retention 
Following calculation of each bidder’s Bi, subjects are ranked from highest cost to 
lowest cost. The number of bidders is then counted and the retention rate is applied. The 
retention rate is simply a numeric value between 0 and 1. If you desire to retain all 
bidders, the retention rate, R, would be 1. If you choose to only retain 50%, R would be 
0.5. 
For the purposes of this experiment, R = 0.5, as we seek to mirror past research 
on the topic that assumed a 50% retention rate.38 
The following calculations are performed following the ranking of bidders: 
 N is counted 
 Number of bidders to retain is calculated by Nr = N * Rr 
 Retention is determined by the statements;  
 if(RANK <= Nr) the bidder is not retained (highest Bi) 
 if(RANK > Nr) the bidder is retained (lower Bi) 
 COV is determined by identifying the first rejected bid (Bi when 
RANK = Nr) 
                                                 
38 Kyle Hahn, “Investigating the Independent and Combinatorial Effects of Non-Monetary Incentives 
Utilizing a Uniform and Discriminatory Auction Mechanism in an Experimental Setting,” (MBA Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
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3. Earnings 
All players that are not retained are paid their respective ISO. 
 If not retained, FI = ISO  
All players that are retained are receive a total compensation value determined by 
the following formulas: 
 FI = COV – (NMI1c) + (NMI1v) if only NMI #1 is selected 
 FI = COV – (NMI2c) + (NMI2v) if only NMI #2 is selected 
 FI = COV – (NMI1c + NMI2c) + (NMICv) if both NMIs are 
selected in combination. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the different auction methods with CRAM. By examining 
approaches to enhance the SRB system for both the sailor and the Navy, uniform price 
reverse auctions seem very promising. Not only can they provide truth-revealing values 
from the sailor; they also ensure that the Navy fully mitigates opportunity cost in its 
forecasts. These reverse auctions also offer important data on the current morale within 
the Navy, as indicated by willingness to stay, and simultaneously optimize retention 
savings. Even considering that NMI values fluctuate between sailors, the Navy will never 
face extraneous costs for retention barring collusion within large vastly dispersed groups 
of sailors. By placing the onus for retention value on the individual sailor, the Navy 
stands to gain accurate retention numbers while maintaining the high standard of 
technical and leadership expertise that it cannot rely upon under the current system.* 
*NOTE: This analysis assumes the military seeks to retain those qualified service 
members (as determined through Perform to Serve) that are most willing to reenlist, as is 
consistent with current SRB policy. There are alternative auction designs that pay 
premium bonuses for more highly qualified service members if quality of the retained 
force is a more important consideration than implied by current SRB policy.39 
                                                 
39 Christopher S. White, “The Uniform Price Quality Adjusted Discount Auction for Aviation 
Continuation Pay: Potential Benefits to the U.S. Marine Corps,” (MBA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2010), 40. 
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V. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
A. MATERIALS 
The experiment designed for this project required the use of computers connected 
via a local area network (LAN). To satisfy this requirement, reservations were made to 
use a computer lab containing 18 computer terminals for subjects and one server 
computer for the experimenters. LAN access is critical based on requirements to compare 
each subject’s input against all other subjects. While it is technically possible to run 
multiple client servers on the same computer, the need for experiment controls and ease 
of input do not make this feasible. Instead, a single login is used for all computers in the 
computer lab.  
Once operating under the single login, experimenters then open client servers on 
all computer terminals that subjects will be using. The computer program and server is 
run from the server terminal at the front of the classroom. 
B. PERMISSIONS AND SOLICITATION 
The Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board (IRB) gave approval 
for this project experiment following completion of the online course and applicable 
request forms. Following approval, requests were made to secure the computer lab and an 
email was sent out to all students studying in the Graduate School of Business and Public 
Policy (GSBPP). Twelve responses were received and the participants were given 
instructions on date, location, time, and estimated duration. 
C. ADMINISTRATION 
One hour prior to the designated experiment time the computer lab was secured of 
all personnel with the exception of experimenters. Twelve computer terminals were 
activated and logged-on using a common login name and password. Client servers were 
opened on each of the computers in the body of the lab. This inhibited any persons from 
 
 32
clicking any buttons or entering any data until the instruction period began. Because the 
server computer being used at the front handles the data generation, no data was 
displayed other than a blank client screen. 
D. PARTICIPANT INFORMATION 
Twelve volunteers participated in the survey. The sample characteristics are 
shown in Figures 9–11. 
 
Figure 9.   Service Representation in Sample 
 
Figure 10.   Rank Representation in Sample 
 33
 
Figure 11.   Gender Representation in Sample 
E. PARTICIPANT INSTRUCTION 
Once all equipment was verified to be in working order, the twelve participants 
were allowed into the classroom and placed randomly at one of the computer terminals. 
At that time, they filled out a consent form and partially filled in the receipt of payment 
they would sign following the transfer of funds at the conclusion of the experiment. 
Instructions identical to those being used by the experimenters were provided at each 
terminal. Subjects were instructed to follow along as the instructions were read aloud and 
to take notes if the participant felt the need. 
The experimental scenario description was read to the participants they 
participated in a 2 round practice session identical to the subsequent 10 rounds of 
recorded play. The experimenters received no questions during the instruction period 
even though the opportunity was offered if needed. During the 2 practice rounds, 
participants were guided through each entry required on the input screen. Once all inputs 
were received, the program automatically advanced to the results stage, displaying the 
outcome of the round to all participants. At that time, the experimenters ensured that 50% 
of the subjects were retained and that no ties had taken place.* 
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*NOTE: Ties are mitigated by adding a small decimal random number to the total 
cost of each person. This is further described in the following chapter. 
F. CONCLUSION AND PAYMENT 
At the conclusion of the experiment, the total value of earnings for each 
participant was calculated and multiplied by an exchange rate. In this experiment, the 
exchange rate was 1 USD = 2.3x10-5 Experimental. Payouts to participants ranged from 





VI. EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND ADMINISTRATION 
A. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
A large portion of this project research involved developing a computer program 
that would compare user inputs from many subjects and determine which of the subjects 
to retain or lay-off. Previous experimentation by Kyle Hahn and Marlow Levy involved 
participants placing bids and comparing them to values that were already part of a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Because it did not compare each subject’s bid to the rest of 
the sample, it was hard to say how, or if, the bidding strategies would change if presented 
with feedback against other players. 
1. Experiment Scenario 
The experiment consisted of 10 rounds of play involving salary offers and 
combinatorial NMI play. Participants are currently working for Firm A, but have an 
alternative cash-only salary offer from Firm B. They are indifferent between working for 
Firm A and Firm B. Firm A is downsizing by laying-off 50% of its current workforce.  It 
is offering current employees the opportunity to submit their required cash salary to 
continue working with Firm A and they are offered a choice of two NMIs.  Firm A has 
publicized the cost of providing the NMI (and the employees’ values are specified in the 
experiment); employees can request none, one or both of the NMIs offered.  The cost of 
any requested NMI is added to the employee’s cash salary request in determining the 
total retention cost. Firm A will retain the 50% of its current employees who request the 
lowest total retention cost; providing each retained employee with a compensation 
package with total cost equal to the first rejected salary request (e.g., a uniform-price 
auction with menu method NMI elicitation). 
All NMIs were displayed in a menu elicitation method. The NMI combinations 
presented to each subject were completely random and could be sub-additive, additive, or 
super-additive.* This complex decision-making scenario affords the best information on 
how subjects react to real-time feedback. It also is the most accurate example of a 
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corporate scenario as firms will choose to offer NMIs to employees based on the 
assumption that people who value NMIs higher than company cost will cost less to retain, 
but will feel as if they are gaining more than simple salary alone. 
*NOTE: Sub-additive refers to any NMI combination whose combinatorial value 
is less than the combined value of each NMI. Additive refers to NMI combinations 
whose combinatorial value is equal to the sum of the two NMI values. Super-additive 
refers to those NMI combinations that are greater than the additive value of the individual 
NMIs. 
B.  PROGRAM 
The CRAM experiment designed for this project utilized the Zurich Toolbox for 
Readymade Economic Experiments (ztree). This program, developed by the University of 
Zurich in Switzerland, features a refined approach to interactive experiments involving 
many subjects. The program itself uses coding typical of visual basic and c++. However, 
the code is placed within separate “stages” throughout the programming window. This 
allows the user to define precisely which stage each calculation should take place.  
The program itself captures many of the fundamental operators desired for 
economic experiments. During an experiment, the researchers log into required terminals 
under one login profile. Once all the computers have been started in this manner, the 
experimenters open the program code on a single computer that starts the server. A client 
server called a “zleaf” is opened on each participant’s terminal. This displays a stagnant 
window until the program is started from the server terminal. Once all subjects are ready 
to begin, the experimenter runs the program from the server terminal and subjects see the 
desired output display on their screen. All inputs are then made by entering data using the 
keypad and clicking a “submit” button at the bottom of the page. Computations are 
autonomous once all subjects have input their data; results are displayed on the screen. 
While the University of Zurich claims that experimenters with no programming 
experience can develop a program quickly, the learning curve is steep for those that have 
never dealt with computer languages. 
 37
1. Program Parameters 
The program developed for this project utilizes the random operator function in 
ztree to generate values between a certain upper and lower bound. This ensures that the 
values presented to each subject accurately reflect various offers that may be encountered 
in real world bidding. The values listed below are consistent with past experiments in the 
CRAM concept. 
 Salary offers from Firm B were randomly generated with a 
minimum value of $50,000 and a maximum value of $150,000. 
 NMI 1 Costs to Firm A were randomly generated with a minimum 
value of $0 and a maximum value of $25,000. 
 NMI 2 Costs to Firm A were randomly generated with a minimum 
value of $0 and a maximum value of $25,000. 
 Personal Value of NMI 1 was a factor ranging between .25–1.25 of 
the NMI 1 cost for that round. 
 Personal Value of NMI 2 was a factor ranging between .25–1.25 of 
the NMI 2 cost for that round. 
 The combinatorial cost of choosing NMI 1 and NMI 2 in 
combination was purely additive of the NMI 1 and NMI 2 cost. 
 The combinatorial value of choosing NMI 1 and NMI 2 in 
combination was a factor ranging from .5–1.25 of the purely 
additive NMI1 and NMI2 values. 
 Total Cost of Each player was determined by the formula: Salary 
requested + Cost of selected NMIs = Bid (Bi) 
 Comparison of each participant Bi was executed in the program 
that ranked them one through twelve.  
 Players ranked 1–6 (Highest Bi) were laid off. 
 Players ranking 7–12 (Lowest Bi) were retained with a total cost to 
Firm A for all retained equal to the first rejected bid (Bi) for 
whichever player ranked #6. 
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2. Program Code 
The experimental program was coded and refined over the course of 
approximately eight weeks. The program’s code is displayed by stage in Appendix B. 
Screenshots of the client displays is found in Appendix C. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter VI provided a brief synopsis of the programming language and coding for 
the experiment. It also includes a discussion of the interface and parameters used in the 
research. Instructions, code, and screenshots can be found in Appendices A–C. 
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VII. RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RESULTS 
The experiment entailed 2 practice rounds and 10 rounds of performance play. 
120 data points were obtained from the experiment. Any possibility of ties at the cutoff 
value was mitigated by generating a random number between 0 and 1 and adding it to 
each subject’s total cost. During the experiment, no ties were observed at any point and 
data was clean and consistent. The players were able to navigate the 10 rounds of 
performance play in approximately 15 minutes time. This efficiency can be attributed to 
the program’s performance and autonomous calculations and displays.  
1. Bidding 
All bids were analyzed independently. During each round, a total bid representing 
the total cost of each player to Firm A was received. The variable “Bi” represents this 
value. The optimal bid for each round was calculated based on the offer from Firm B and 
the optimal NMI selection for each player. The variable “Bi*” represents this value. 
Optimal bids are those that follow the formula:  
Salary Offer from Firm B 
- Value of Selected NMIs 
Salary request to Firm A 
 
Figure 12 shows the results of dividing the actual bids, Bi, by the optimal bids, 
Bi*. Answers are in percentages relative to the optimal bid; 100% represents an optimal 
bid, bids less than 100% represents under-bidding relative to the optimum, bids greater 
than 100% represent over-bidding relative to the optimum. 
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Figure 12.   Actual Bid divided by Optimal Bid (Percent) 
The approximately 20 bids that lie above 125% represent bids that were received 
on salary offers from Firm B that were below $90,000. Some salary requests were twice 
the initial offer before accounting for selected NMI costs, reflecting irrationality in 
subject strategy. 
If we look at the optimal bids (Bi*) for each subject vs the actual bids (Bi), we see 
that over half of the bids were above the optimal bid. This has the potential to cause Firm 
A to overpay for those retained. However, if the majority of subjects that bid rationally, 




Figure 13.   Difference in Bidding (Bi – Bi*) 
The trend lines show that on average, the bidding strategies maintained 
throughout the experiment inappropriately calculated reservation values and NMI values 
shown above. The data shows that for any given bid (Bi) the company would pay an 
approximate $20,000 premium to retain employees. 
The average bid for all 120 trials is $16,967 above the average optimal bid with a 
standard deviation of $18,332. Based on statistical analysis, we can say with 95% 
confidence that Bi will range from $16,967 +/- $3280. It should be noted that the average 
standard deviation for a previous experiment was approximately 20%, whereas the 
experimental standard deviation here is 24%.40 
                                                 
40 Kyle Hahn, “Investigating the Independent and Combinatorial Effects of Non-Monetary Incentives 
Utilizing a Uniform and Discriminatory Auction Mechanism in an Experimental Setting,” (MBA Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 82. 
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2. Potential and Actual Cost Savings 
The potential cost savings to the Navy is large if we use a Uniform, monetary 
only, auction as our reference. In this auction, only money is offered and if optimal 
bidding strategies are assumed, the Bi received from each subject will be the same as the 
salary offer from Firm B. The monetary bonus offered each retained sailor is the 
monetary bonus requested by the first excluded bidder (equal to their Firm B salary 
offer). With NMIs, all bidders should reduce their monetary bids by the value of any 
NMIs requested.  Because they only request NMIs where the value is greater than the 
cost, this reduces the Navy’s expected retention costs.  
In Figure 14, comparing the uniform, monetary only costs to the optimal costs 
with NMIs shows that uniform auctions without NMIs cost more than CRAM auctions if 
all participants bid optimally. In this case, optimal bids, Bi*, offer Firm A reduced cost 
because the Navy’s cost of for NMIs is less than the personal value of the NMI.  
 
Figure 14.   Total Cost to Firm A per Round 
The potential cost savings using a uniform price auction with NMIs is 5% over 




the actual bids (Bi) yielded a potential loss of 15% compared to the optimal outcome for 
10 rounds of bidding. The results from this experiment showed a definite increase in 
bidding delta (Bi – Bi*) from past experiments.41  
3. NMI Analysis 
Subjects were presented with three types of NMI combinations in the experiment. 
The first is what we term linear. For linear combinations, the value of the two NMIs in 
combination is purely additive. If NMI 1 is valued at $10,000 and NMI 2 is valued at 
$8,000, the combinatorial value would be $10,000 + $8,000 = $18,000. When presented 
with additive (linear) combinations, subjects chose the correct combination 71% of the 
time. 
 
Figure 15.   NMI Choice when presented with Additive Combination 
Sub-additive combinations are NMI combinations that have a combined value less 
than the additive value of each NMI. If values for NMI 1 and NMI 2 were $10,000 and 
$8,000, respectively, a sub-additive combinatorial value would be anything less than 
                                                 
41 Kyle Hahn, “Investigating the Independent and Combinatorial Effects of Non-Monetary Incentives 
Utilizing a Uniform and Discriminatory Auction Mechanism in an Experimental Setting,” (MBA Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
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$18,000. In this case, subjects might prefer to choose a single NMI if a single NMI 
provides them greater surplus value than the combination. In this experiment, when 
presented with sub-additive NMI combinations, subjects chose correctly only 58% of the 
time. While subjects found it more difficult to decipher the appropriate choice in sub-
additive combinations, this is potentially the most difficult situation to make the correct 
decision if the value of both NMIs in isolation excedds the costm but the combinatorial 
surplus value is, at times, less than one or the other of the two singular surplus NMI 
values. 
 
Figure 16.   NMI Choice when presented with Sub-Additive Combination 
Lastly, subjects dealt with super-additive NMI combinations, meaning the value 
of the two in combination is greater than the additive value of the two NMIs in isolation. 
In this case, if NMI 1 is worth $10,000 and NMI 2 is worth $8,000, the combination 
value must be greater than $18,000. When presented with super-additive NMI 
combinations, participants chose the correct combination 88% of the time. 
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The total percentage of correct choices for all NMI combinations was 70%, which 
agrees well with previous results, showing a 66% optimal choice.42 This shows that, 
while participants had trouble with sub-additive values, most subjects chose correctly 
when presented with super-additive NMI combination. 
 
Figure 17.   NMI Choice when Presented with Super-Additive Combination 
B. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
What bidding strategies are adopted within a uniform-price real-time auction 
mechanism employing non-monetary incentives and human subject competition? 
a. Answer 
There are two issues when dealing with optimal bidding strategies. The 
first is whether the participants choose the correct NMI combinations. We noted in the 
NMI results that 70% of NMI choices are made correctly; the most difficult of the three 
scenarios was the sub-additive combination as it could require subjects to decide whether 
                                                 
42 Kyle Hahn, “Investigating the Independent and Combinatorial Effects of Non-Monetary Incentives 
Utilizing a Uniform and Discriminatory Auction Mechanism in an Experimental Setting,” (MBA Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 76. 
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an individual NMI, or the NMI combination, provided the greatest good, even in 
situations where both NMIs provide a positive surplus value. It should also be noted that 
most errors happened when the sub-additive surplus value was greater than the greatest 
singular NMI value, but less than the additive value. Based on the overall performance, I 
conclude that subjects generally chose rationally when presented with complex NMI 
combinations. 
Secondly, we must look at the salary requested once NMIs were chosen. 
Clearly, the bid requests (Bi) were above the optimal bid trend. This, coupled with the 
fact that NMIs were generally chosen correctly, shows that most participants 
miscalculated their salary request. Most subjects requested salaries near Firm B’s salary 
offer. In a uniform price monetary auction, this would be the optimal bid strategy. 
However, NMIs provide each employee value that must be incorporated into the salary 
request to Firm A.  
The only systematic irrationalities witnessed in the experiment were 
participants that received salary offers from Firm B below $90,000. I hypothesize that 
they had already seen larger values, so they assumed that they should bid much higher 
because other participants should have higher offers. In reality, this makes little 
difference in a uniform price auction, as the person will be paid the salary offer from 
Firm B if not retained, and will receive a standard cost compensation package equal to 
the first excluded bid if retained. This behavior does not reflect optimal bidding in the 
CRAM concept; however, underlying factors such as doubt and knowledge of former 
bids can cloud decision making. 
2. Secondary Questions 
a. Does competition between human subjects alter bidding strategies as opposed 




The only irrational bidding strategy was adopted when subjects were 
presented with values they seemed to believe were at the low end of the spectrum. At no 
point did we see any behavior that would suggest alteration of bid strategies compared to 
computerized optimal bidding competition.  
I attribute this to clear instructional methods. Each subject was repeatedly 
told they had no preference for Firm A or Firm B and that switching jobs would not cost 
them any emotional, physical, or monetary stress. As a result, participants continued to 
bid rationally, albeit utilizing incorrect formulas.  
b. Is the real-time auction viable based on alterations or consistencies in 
subjects’ bidding strategies? 
b. Answer 
I believe the auction is viable for use in the Navy. Its truth revealing 
qualities provide a great avenue for reducing cost and precisely maintaining manpower. 
While any experimenter will encounter extremes in bidding strategies, the theory is still 
sound. However, other controls and instructions should be introduced prior to 
implementing a formal retention auction.  
C. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This project expanded the understanding of bidding strategies when confronted 
with real-time complex decision-making. I expected that subjects would behave 
rationally, but was suspicious of any mental uncertainties and reservations that may cause 
them to bid irrationally. I anticipated that NMIs and their combinations would be chosen 
optimally during the majority of the experiments.  
The CRAM concept is an incredibly efficient method of retention in both 
manpower and budget. It places the responsibility on the sailor to offer up a truthful 
valuation of personal willingness to serve in the U.S. Navy and mitigates costs associated 
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with under- or over-retention. In this time of cost cutting and force shaping, the Navy 
needs tools that enable them to meet their retention goals at the optimal cost. 
The experiment showed consistent bidding strategies even though they did not 
represent optimal bidding strategies. These non-optimal bidding strategies pose new 
questions as to how CRAM will be administered if put into fleet use. Even so, only 6-
10% of bids showed drastic departures from the bidding strategies used in this 
experiment, which proves CRAM can still be an effective tool for actual Navy use. 
CRAM benefits not only the Navy’s bottom line but sailors’ value as well. It certainly 
serves the greatest good for both parties. 
1. Recommendations 
I strongly recommend that any further experimentation involve a computer 
science graduate student in tandem with a business student. Not only will each specific 
expertise yield a superior product, but the experiment can be expanded to the Internet. 
This would allow groups of Navy personnel to participate offsite via video 
teleconference.  
I also recommend that an experimental treatment revise the instructions to more 
clearly state the optimal bidding strategy. It should be clearly stated that the offer from 
firm B should cover the salary request to Firm A and the value of any NMIs chosen at 
firm A. This would hopefully elicit data closer to optimal cost and should be discussed 
repeatedly during the instruction session to see if experimental participants offer closer to 
optimal bids. 
2. Further Research 
I recommend performing the experiment with groups of enlisted personnel while 
tailoring the offers based on their current salaries and benefits. Based on the controls of 
the experiment, all subjects are supposed to assume no preference for their current 
employer, Firm A, or Firm B. We know this would not be true if actually implemented, 
as job security, current salary, and benefits would all play a large role in decision-
making. 
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I also recommend that more instructional emphasis be placed on the 
compensation effects of a cash salary request and NMIs in combination. Even though the 
current instructions clearly stated that no NMIs will be received if retained by Firm B; 
some subjects still assumed that the cash salary request should be equal the Firm B offer 
and any NMIs should provide a premium over the Firm B offer. 
Lastly, the distribution for salary offers should be changed from the 50k–150K 
currently used to 100K–199K. This should help to minimize irrational bidding by 
ensuring all offers are six digit amounts. I believe some of the irrational behavior 
exhibited in the experiment was a direct result of receiving a cash offer that was five 
figures vice six. 
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APPENDIX A.  INSTRUCTIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Please do not click any buttons until instructed to do so. If you have not done so already, 
please fill out the participant questionnaire located at each computer. You will turn this in 
at the conclusion of the experiment. 
 
The experiment in which you are participating investigates decision-making within labor 
markets. You will be asked to make decisions based on salary offers and non-monetary 
incentives (NMI). 
 
Please listen carefully as we begin a short instructional period. The instruction period will 
last approximately 30 minutes and the experiment should conclude in approximately 1 
hour.  
 
This is an individual decision-making exercise and should be treated as such. It is 
imperative that you do not communicate with other participants in any way during the 
entirety of the experiment. Also, do not look on any other participants’ computer screen 
at any time during the experiment.  
 
SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
The experiment itself will consist of 10 rounds. The instruction period will involve going 
through 2 practice rounds identical to the experimental rounds. As we go through the 
practice round, please do not type anything or click any buttons unless instructed to do 
so. 
 
1. You are 1 of __ (will be based on number of subjects) employees currently employed 
at Firm A. 
2. Firm B is your only other potential employer. 
3. You do not have any preference for Firm A or Firm B. 
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4. You may change employers easily at no cost or inconvenience. 
5. Maximizing your annual compensation is your only goal. 
6. Your compensation may consist of both monetary and non-monetary incentives. 
 
Non-Monetary Incentives (NMIs) 
A non-monetary incentive (NMI) is any compensation given to an employee other than 
cash. 
Examples of NMIs include such benefits as: 
-- Childcare, 
-- Access to recreation facilities, and 
-- ability to maintain geographic stability. 
 
Firm A will submit two proposed non-monetary incentives (NMIs) to each participant. 
These will be generically referred to as NMI 1 and NMI 2. If you so choose, in addition 
to the salary provided by Firm A you may also receive: 
(a) NMI 1 only. 
(b) NMI 2 only. 
(c) Both NMI 1 and NMI 2, or 
(d) Neither NMI 1 nor NMI 2. 
 
It is solely up to the employees retained by Firm A to choose the NMIs they wish to 
receive. Making the decision to select or reject an NMI will be further discussed in the 
next section. 
 
Your Value for Non-Monetary Incentives 
There will be three values listed for NMIs. Two will be for NMI 1 and NMI 2 alone, 
while one value will be a combinatorial value if both NMI 1 and NMI 2 are selected: 
 
1. Personal Value of Receiving NMI 1 $ 
2. Personal Value of Receiving NMI 2 $ 
3. Personal Value of Receiving Both NMI 1 and NMI 2 $ 
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These values define your personal valuation of NMI 1 and NMI 2 as well as the 
combination value of both NMIs together. 
Effectively, each NMI value is the same as a monetary incentive of an equivalent amount. 
For decision purposes, you will desire to receive the NMI more than any monetary value 
less than the personal value of the NMI. 
At the same time, you want to receive a cash amount greater than the NMI value, if 
available. 
Please note that the value of the NMIs in combination may be less than (sub-additive) or 
greater than (super-additive) than simply summing the personal value of NMI 1 and NMI 
2. 
Total compensation with NMI is equal to: 
(1) Your annual salary, plus 
(2) Your value for any NMIs or combination of NMIs you receive. 
Your total earnings for each period are determined by the total value of the compensation 
package. That is the total of your salary and the value of any NMIs received. 
Salary offers and NMI values will change as we advance through each round of the 
experiment. 
 
The Value of NMIs in Combination 
The NMI 1 and NMI 2 combination value will not always be the same as the sum of the 
two NMIs (purely additive). 
The value in combination may exceed the additive value of NMI 1 and NMI 2 (super 
additive). 
Conversely, the combination value of NMI 1 and NMI 2 may be less than the additive 
value (sub additive). 
These differences in NMI values may be used to decide which NMIs you choose. 
 
The Distribution of NMI Values 
Each employee will value NMIs differently. 
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Some employees will have a very low value of an NMI while another employee may 
value the same NMI very highly. 
For both of the NMIs offered by Firm A, employee valuations will range between $0 and 
$25,000. 
The NMI values are generated randomly throughout the range, so each employee will 
have a different valuation of the same NMI. 
 
The Cost of Non-Monetary Incentives 
There is a cost to Firm A provide each NMI to an employee. 
NMI 1 and NMI 2 will have a distinct cost to Firm A.  
 
1. Firm A Cost to Provide NMI 1 only $ 
2. Firm A Cost to Provide NMI 2 only $ 
3. Firm A Cost to Provide NMI 1 and NMI 2 $ 
 
Please note that the cost incurred by Firm A to provide both NMIs in combination is the 
sum of NMI 1 cost and NMI 2 cost. 
 
Downsizing at Firm A 
Firm A will be downsizing. 50% of its employees will face immediate layoff. 
Employees will have parity in job security at both Firm A and Firm B following the 
layoffs. 
 
Employment Offer from Firm B 
Firm B will employ anyone who is laid off by Firm A. 
You will go to work for Firm B immediately if laid off by Firm A. 
 
Salary Offer from Firm B 
A confidential salary offer to work at Firm B has been received by each employee 
currently working at Firm A. 
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This offer reflects the annual salary an employee will make if they come to work for Firm 
B. 
All salary offers from Firm B are unique to each employee. 
Salary Offer From Firm B: $ 
If you go to work for Firm B you will receive the salary offer alone and will not receive 
any non-monetary incentives. 
 
Distribution of Salary Offers from Firm B 
You will only be shown your unique salary offer from Firm B. You will not be shown 
any other employees salary offer from Firm B. 
Firm B’s salary offers are spread evenly between an upper and lower limit. 
You will not be provided with the range of the salary offers from Firm B. 
Each unique salary offer will lie somewhere between the upper and lower limit. 
Because the salary offers are randomly generated, your offer may be higher or lower than 
other employees. 
 
Determining Which Employees to Retain at Firm A 
Firm A will retain 50% of employees.  
Firm A will determine the level of compensation based on NMI choices and Salary 
request. Together, these will reflect your total cost to the corporation. 
Retention will be determined by evaluating total cost based on: 
1. Any NMIs the employee wishes to receive if they are chosen for retention by Firm A; 
and 
2. The salary requested by the employee if he/she is retained by Firm A. 
Firm A’s calculation of total cost will be according to the following formula 
(1) The total cost of any singular NMIs or NMIs in combination that are selected by the 
employee, plus 
(2) The annual salary amount desired by the employee from Firm A in the survey. 
The employees who submit the lowest 50% of cost compensation package requests will 
be retained by Firm A. 
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The employees who submit the highest 50% of cost compensation package requests will 
be laid off by Firm A. 
Any employees laid off will immediately begin work for Firm B at the annual salary 
offered at the beginning of each round. 
Determining Compensation for Employees at Firm A 
We assume that employees will receive different levels of compensation to remain at 
Firm A due to different choices in NMI selection. 
However, the total cost of each compensation package will be the same for each retained 
employee regardless of salary or NMIs requested. 
Each employee will receive a package that is equivalent to the compensation request of 
the lowest-cost laid-off employee. 
For example, we will refer to the cost of the lowest-cost laid-off employee as the "cutoff 
cost." 
Any retained employees will have submitted compensation requests that are lower than 
the cutoff cost. 
Any employee that is retained by Firm A will receive any NMIs that he/she requested 
during the survey. 
Each employee retained by Firm A will receive a salary calculated by the following: 
 
NMI(s)   Received Salary Received 
None   Cutoff Cost 
NMI 1  Cutoff Cost - Cost of NMI 1 
NMI 2  Cutoff Cost - Cost of NMI 2 
NMI 1 & NMI 2  Cutoff Cost - Cost of NMI 1 - Cost of NMI 2 
 
All employees retained by Firm A will receive a salary equal to the cutoff cost minus the 
cost of any NMIs received. Because NMI cost may vary, not all retained employees will 
receive the same salary, but total compensation will be the same for all employees 
retained by Firm A. 
As a result, total compensation for those retained by Firm A will not depend on: 
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1. His/her salary request, nor 
2. The personal value of any NMIs selected. 
 
PRACTICE ROUND – PRACTICE SALARY AND NMI SURVEY (PRACTICE 
ROUNDS 1&2) 
 
You should now all be looking at a screen that displays: 
 
1. Salary offer from Firm B. 
2. Firm A cost of providing NMI 1 
3. Personal Value of Receiving NMI 1 
4. Firm A cost of providing NMI 2 
5. Personal Value of Receiving NMI 2 
6. Personal Value of Receiving NMI 1 and 2 
 
You may refer to this instruction sheet at any time during the experiment if you need to 
refresh your understanding of the scenario. If you still have questions, please raise your 
hand and someone will be with you shortly. 
 
Let’s focus on the computer screen and begin describing entry of numerical values 
and selection of NMIs. 
 
1. “Enter bid for retention” will consist of you entering your desired salary to stay at 
Firm A. Your response should be an integer with no decimals. 
2. NMI selection will be accomplished in this manner: 
a. If you desire the NMI, you will enter a “1” in the box next to the desired 
NMI. 
b. If you do not desire an NMI, you will enter a “0” in the box next to that 
NMI.  
i. For example, if you want NMI 1 you would place a “1” in the 
respective box. 
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ii. If you do not want NMI 2, you will place a “0” in that respective 
box. 
iii. If you desire both, you should place a “1” in BOTH NMI boxes. 
 
READ: Your Salary Request to Firm A 
Please do not type anything in the boxes or click the 
“Submit” button at the bottom of the page yet. During the experimental rounds, however, 
you will determine the annual salary and NMIs that you would like to request from Firm 
A based on the information above, and you will type your request in the white boxes at 
the bottom of this page.  
 
During the experimental rounds, you will also be free to click the “Submit” button 
whenever you are satisfied with the salary and NMI request you have entered. 
 
DATA ENTRY PRACTICE ROUND 1 
 
We will now begin to enter data on the screen in front of you. 
 
For illustration purposes during this practice round, 
I would like each of you to type an amount equal to (Firm B’s offer + 25,000) in the 
white box titled “Enter bid for retention.”  
 
Now, please place a “0” in the white box next to the title “Do you wish to accept the first 
NMI?” This indicates that you desire NOT to receive NMI 1. 
 
Now, please place a “0” in the white box next to the title “Do you wish to accept the 
second NMI?” This indicates that you desire NOT to receive NMI 2. 
 
After you have done so, you may click on the “Submit” button. 
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Once all offers have been submitted, you will see a button in the bottom right hand corner 
of the screen that reads “Click to View Results.” Please click this button and advance to 
the results screen. 
 
PRACTICE ROUND 1 OUTCOME 
You should now all be looking at the retention screen. If you are in the lowest 50%, you 
are retained by Firm A. 
 
If you have a “1” next to the title “retained” you were retained by Firm A. Your total 
salary is noted along with any NMIs received. The total compensation is your salary plus 
the value of any NMIs received. 
 
If you have a “0” next to the title “retained” you were NOT retained by Firm A. If you 
were not retained, you receive NO NMIs and your salary and total compensation are 
equal to the Salary offer from Firm B. 
 
Does anyone have any questions? Ok, please click the “Continue” button and advance to 
practice round 2.  
 
PRACTICE ROUND 2 WITH NMIs 
 
For illustration purposes during this practice round, 
I would like each of you to type an amount equal to (Firm B’s offer + 25,000) in the 
white box titled “Enter bid for retention.”  
 
Now, please place a “1” in the white box next to the title “Do you wish to accept the first 
NMI?” This indicates that you desire NMI 1. 
 
Now, please place a “1” in the white box next to the title “Do you wish to accept the 
second NMI?” This indicates that you desire NMI 2 as well. 
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After you have done so, you may click on the “Submit” button with the mouse. 
 
Again, Once all offers have been submitted, you will see a button in the bottom right 
hand corner of the screen that reads “Click to View Results.” Please click this button and 
advance to the results screen. 
 
PRACTICE ROUND 2 OUTCOME 
 
You should again be looking at the retention screen. If you are in the lowest 50%, you are 
retained by Firm A. 
 
If you have a “1” next to the title “retained” you were retained by Firm A. Your total 
salary is noted along with any NMIs received. The total compensation is your salary plus 
the value of any NMIs received. 
 
If you have a “0” next to the title “retained” you were NOT retained by Firm A. If you 
were not retained, you receive NO NMIs and your salary and total compensation are 
equal to the Salary offer from Firm B. 
 
Do not hit “continue” until instructed to do so. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Before clicking the “Continue” button at the bottom of the screen to start the actual 
experimental rounds, are there any questions on the experiment procedure? 
 
Once we begin, you will be free to navigate through each round whenever you are ready. 
The program will ensure that no participants advance to any subsequent rounds until all 
entries have been made. Please ensure that you have double checked all values before 
hitting “submit’.  
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You are free to click “continue” and begin the experiment. If you have any problems, 
please notify one of the experimenters. Good luck. 
 
 
Participant Information Questionnaire          ______ 
 
 
First Name ________________________________ 
 
Last Name _________________________________ 
Rank ______________________________________ 
Branch of Service _________________________ 
Number of Years in Service ________________ 








I, (print name) _______________________________, acknowledge that I received 
compensation of $___________________ for my participation. 
Signature: _______________________________ Date:____________ 
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APPENDIX B.  PROGRAM CODE 
A. INPUT STAGE 1 
 
//Offers will be randomly generated numbers between 50000 and 150000,  
//rounded to the nearest thousand dollars 
Offer = round( 50000 + random() * 100000, 1000); 
 
//NMIs will be randomly generated numbers between 0 and 25000, 
//rounded to the nearest thousand dollars 
 
//NMI Number 1 
NMI1 = round( random() * 25000, 1000); 
 
//NMI 1 Cost to Firm A 
NMI1CorCost = round( (NMI1) * (.25+ random()), 1000); 
 
//NMI Number 2 
NMI2 = round( random() * 25000, 1000); 
 
//NMI 2 Cost to Firm A 
NMI2CorCost = round( (NMI2) * (.25+ random()), 1000); 
 
//NMI Values in Combination 
NMI3 = round( (NMI1+NMI2) * (.5+(.75 * random())), 1000); 
 
B. CALCULATION STAGE 1 
 
//Finds total cost of each player 
NMI1_Cost = if (NMI1_Rep == 1, NMI1CorCost, 0); 
NMI2_Cost = if (NMI2_Rep == 1, NMI2CorCost, 0); 
TCost = BIDRET + NMI1_Cost + NMI2_Cost + random(); 
 
C. CALCULATION STAGE 2 
//Ranks players by Total Cost 
Rank = count (same( Group ) & TCost >= :TCost); 
 
//Counts number of players 
N = count ( same (Group)); 
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//Determines how many to retain based on percentages (this case 50%) 
NRet = round(N * .5, 1); 
 
//Determines if retained or not retained 
Retain = if(Rank > NRet, 1, 0); 
 
//Determines total value 
NMI1_Val = if (NMI1_Rep == 1 & NMI2_Rep == 0, NMI1, 0); 
NMI2_Val = if (NMI1_Rep == 0 & NMI2_Rep == 1, NMI2, 0); 
NMI3_Val = if (NMI1_Rep == 1 & NMI2_Rep == 1, NMI3, 0); 
 
//Return Highest Value for those retained 
if(Rank == NRet) {Coff = TCost;} 
 
//Determines NMIs received 
NMI1_rec = if(Retain == 1, NMI1_Rep, 0); 
NMI2_rec = if(Retain == 1, NMI2_Rep, 0); 
 
D. CALCULATIONS STAGE 3 
//Applies cutoff value to all players 
MCoff = round( maximum(Coff), 1000); 
 
//Determines Salary 
Salary = if(Retain == 1, MCoff - NMI1_Cost - NMI2_Cost, Offer); 
 
//Determines Income 
Income = if(Retain == 1, MCoff + NMI1_Val + NMI2_Val + NMI3_Val, Offer); 
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APPENDIX C.  EXPERIMENT SCREENS 
 
Figure 18.   Programming Screen (cropped for better readability) 
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Figure 19.   Initial Output Screen (cropped for better readability) 
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Figure 20.   Retention Output Screen (cropped for better readability) 
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APPENDIX D.  EXPERIMENT NOTES 
November 29, 2010 @ 1300: 
- Started on time 
- Experimenters: Joshua Tiley and Bill Gates 
- 12 participants showed up for survey 
- All computer terminals were functional 
- Instruction period lasted 20 minutes 
- All rounds were combinatorial, menu type elicitation 
- Program performed with zero issues 
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